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Mitchell v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 63076 (Apr. 30 2015)1 
 
EVIDENCE: PRIVILEGE 
 
Summary 
 
 Original petition for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to sustain the 
privileges asserted by a defendant doctor in a medical malpractice case to his personal 
counseling and treatment records was granted and denied in part. The court determined 1) 
Mitchell’s family and marital therapy records were privileged 2) Mitchell’s doctor-patient 
records were subject to NRS 49.245(3) patient-litigation exception, but 3) the doctor-
patient records should have been reviewed in camera by the district court before 
discovery.  
 
Background 
 
Seven-year-old Alec Bunting, the real party in interest, experienced heart 
problems following a tonsillectomy performed by Dr. Mitchell, necessitating the use of a 
pacemaker. Bunting’s guardian at litem Stella Ravella sued Mitchell for medical 
malpractice and Mitchell’s employer for negligent hiring and supervision. Ravella’s 
complaint alleges Mitchell mis-administered anesthesia during surgery due to drug 
addiction, and Mitchell’s employer should have known of his addiction and prevented 
him from performing surgeries. Mitchell maintains he never performed surgeries under 
the influence of drugs, but three months after the tonsillectomy Mitchell was arrested and 
convicted for domestic violence under the influence of drugs and for driving under the 
influence. In depositions, Mitchell revealed he pursued marriage counseling and 
substance abuse treatment by two different doctors.  
Ravella alleges that Mitchell was under the influence of drugs when he operated 
on Bunting and that Mitchell’s employer should have known of his addition. In order to 
prove her allegations, Ravella subpoenaed Mitchell’s counseling and substance abuse 
treatment records. Mitchell objected on the grounds of doctor-patient privilege and 
family-therapist-client privileges.  
Although extraordinary writs to review discovery orders are generally not 
available, 2  the Court found it appropriate here because the repercussions of direct 
disclosure of privileged information are not easily addressed by an appeal.3 The Court 
found the present case presented an unsettled and important issue of statutory privilege 
law, and sought to clarify the law when it is the plaintiff who puts the defendant’s 
physical or mental condition at issue, and the defendant asserts privilege.  
 
Discussion  
 
 The court analyzed two different issues of statutory privilege: NRS 49.225 and 
NRS 49.247. The legal question of whether these confidential communications lost their 
                                                        
1
  By Stacy Newman. 
2
  Clark Cnty. Liquor & Gaming, Licensing Bd. v. Clark, 102 Nev. 654 (1986). 
3
  Wardleigh v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 111 Nev. 345 (1995). 
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privileged status when Mitchell’s drug addiction became relevant the to the claims is 
reviewed de novo.4  
 
The Doctor-Patient Privilege 
 
 A patient who voluntarily puts his or her mental or physical condition at issue in a 
lawsuit typically loses any doctor-patient privilege about that condition, as they are 
considered to have waived the privilege by raising the issue.5 Many states, including 
Nevada, codified this at-issue waiver doctrine into a patient-litigant statutory exception.6 
Mitchell argues neither the at-issue waiver doctrine nor the statutory patient-litigant 
exception applies unless it is the patient his or herself who puts the physical or mental 
condition at issue.7 In other words, Mitchell argues that denying Ravella’s allegations 
about his physical or mental condition is not voluntarily putting those conditions at issue, 
and thus the at-issue waiver doctrine and patient-litigant exception is inappropriate. 
 The court agrees the at-issue waiver doctrine is inappropriate in the present case, 
but finds Nevada’s statutory patient-litigation exception still applies to Mitchell’s doctor-
patient communications. The Court holds a plain reading of NRS 49.245(3) does not 
support a requirement that the patient must be the one to place his or her condition at 
issue for the exception to terminate the privilege, and the exception applies regardless of 
who raised the issue that triggered it.  
 Furthermore, the Court found that under NRS 49.015, the Court is obligated to 
constrain any non-constitutional privileges to those that the Legislature authorizes. The 
sparse legislative history suggests Mitchell’s interpretation of the statutory patient-litigant 
exception was expressly rejected in favor of an exception that would apply regardless of 
who raised the issue. The legislature adopted the patient-litigant Model Rule of Evidence 
but struck language that would be most favorable to Mitchell’s argument, suggesting that 
the Legislature did not want to limit the exception to claims the patient initiated. 
 The Court rejected the out of state court cases Mitchell used to bolster his 
argument and compared Nevada’s patient-litigant exception statute to those of Texas and 
Utah, states with the most similar statutory language. The Court uses Texas and Utah’s 
statutes to show that allowing any litigant to initiate the claims or defenses which trigger 
the exception does not reduce the privilege to the point of absurdity because the condition 
must be more than “merely relevant” to a claim or defense.8 The Court also refuted 
Mitchell’s claims that such an interpretation of NRS 49.245(3) is unfair, and declined to 
read in a limitation not stated.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
4
  Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 69 (2014). 
5
  Kenneth S. Broun et. al., McCormick on Evidence § 103, at 641 (7th ed. 2013). 
6
   NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.245(3) 
7
  Mitchell cites in this appeal for the first time NEV. REV. STAT. § 458.280, which provides that records 
created at an alcoholism and substance abuse treatment center and confidential and “must not be disclosed 
without consent of the patient.” The Court finds that because Mitchell did not make this argument during 
trial it is therefore waived. 
8
  Mitchell, 131 Nev. Adv. Op at 12; see also R.K. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994). 
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Element of a Claim or Defense 
 
 Although the Court found the patient-litigant exception applies regardless of who 
raises it, the exception only applies if the condition of the patient is an element of a claim 
or defense in the proceeding. The Court defined an element as “part of a claim that must 
be proved for the claim to succeed,”9 and that for a condition to be “part of” that element, 
the patient’s condition must a fact “to which the substantive law assigns significance.”10 
 Under this test, the Court found that allegations of Mitchell’s drug addiction was 
not an element of Ravella’s malpractice claim against him. Drug addiction was relevant 
only as an explanation of why Mitchell fell below a standard of care – not whether or not 
the care actually fell below the standard in the first place.11 Thus, while Mitchell’s drug 
addiction is relevant to Ravella’s malpractice claim, it cannot be considered an element of 
the claim. 
 However, the Court found that Mitchell’s drug addiction was an element of 
Ravella’s negligent hiring and supervision claims because that claim requires Ravella 
prove that the clinic knew or should have known that Mitchell was unfit to perform 
surgeries.12 
 
In Camera Review 
 
 The Court recognizes that application of patient-litigant exceptions on behalf of 
someone else “demands close scrutiny,” 13  and a non-patient must demonstrate to a 
“reasonable certainty” that the records sought contain evidence material to the claim or 
defense asserted for the district court to proceed with an in camera review of them.14 
Even though Mitchell’s arrest record and admissions in depositions were sufficient for 
Ravella to charge that Mitchell may have been under the influence during the surgery in 
question, the district court should have reviewed the records in camera before making 
them discoverable. 
 
Family Therapist-Client Privilege 
 
 The Court found no basis existed to overcome the family therapist-client privilege 
in NRS 49.247 because neither Mitchell nor his wife put their counseling session at issue 
and the client-litigant exception for this privilege is much narrower than the patient-
litigant exception.15  
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  Blacks Law Dictionary 559 (8th ed. 2004). 
10
  RK. v. Ramirez, 887 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. 1994). 
11
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Conclusion 
 
As far as the medical records relating to the substance abuse treatment, the court 
conditionally granted the writ of mandamus and directed the district court to review 
Mitchell’s doctor-patient records in camera. The district court was also directed to 
rescind its order rejecting the claims of family therapist-client privilege and keep those 
records confidential.  
